Finite-key-size security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum-key-distribution protocol

Mhlambululi Mafu, Kevin Garapo, Francesco Petruccione

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The postselection technique was introduced by Christandl, König, and Renner [Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.102.020504] in order to simplify the security of quantum-key-distribution schemes. Here, we present how it can be applied to study the security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 trine-state protocol, a symmetric version of the Bennett 1992 protocol.

Original languageEnglish
Article number032308
JournalPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sep 8 2014


All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

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